#### **Both Sides Now:**

### Urban Growth and Convergence Dynamics in the Age of Internet

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### The age of internet

- the idea of a network allowing users from different nodes to communicate through their PCs dates back to the 1950s
- the first message was sent over the ARPANET (funded by the U.S. Department of Defense) in 1969 from a laboratory at UCLA to the second network node at Stanford
- National Science Foundation began to commercialize the Internet in 1992. Popularity of the net becomes massive during the 1990s thanks to the introduction of the World Wide Web
- since the end of the 1990s, broadband technology and hi-speed connections has allowed the rise of near-instant communication (electronic mail, instant messaging, voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone calls, two-way interactive video calls)



Source: Digital Nation Data Explorer, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, US Department of Commerce

### Motivation of the paper

- near-instant communication services is likely to have an strong impact on the transmission of tacit knowledge
- knowledge is the basic input in research activities
- $\Rightarrow$  the diffusion of near-instant communication is likely to affect:
  - $\rightarrow$  research activity and innovation
  - $\rightarrow$  the spatial distribution of research and innovation

**Research question**: how has internet and, in particular, the development of near-instant communication impacted on economic growth and convergence dynamics across areas of an integrated economic system?

### Some basic facts

#### Innovation is essentially a clustered, urban phenomenon

- the clustering of R&D labs in the US is greater than the clustering of manufacturing facilities (Buzard et al, 2017)
- the top 50 US metros account for 97 percent of all venture capital investment, a key driver of innovation (correlation with patents is 0.588, significant at the 1% level, between 2005 and 2009) (Florida and King, 2016)



### Some basic facts

Since the turn of the millennium, both per capita GDP and innovation across US metros have shown a tendency to diverge



#### MSAs - log of GDP per capita (2001-2017) vs log of Patents per capita (2000-2015)

### Some basic facts

Over the same period, the spatial features of divergence in per capita GDP mirror those of innovation



**MSAs – GDP per capita (2001-2017)** 

## Summing up these basic facts

Since the turn of the millennium:

- near-instant communication services may have an impact on the transmission of tacit knowledge and, hence, on R&D activities
- R&D activities and innovation are geographically concentrated
- R&D and innovation are essentially urban activities
- there is a positive correlation between per capita GDP levels and innovations

 $\Rightarrow$  we seek to develop a theoretical model of urban economic growth that conforms to these basic facts

### Economic growth and technological progress: an overview



### The traditional neoclassical model

**Production function**: Y=F(K,AL)

features:increasing<br/>homogenous of degree 1<br/>twice differentiable<br/>jointly concave in all arguments<br/>strictly concave in each argument<br/>Inada conditions (1963): $\lim_{K \to 0} F'(K) = \infty$  $\lim_{K \to \infty} F'(K) = 0$ <br/> $\lim_{L \to \infty} F'(L) = 0$ 

Technology:  $A_t = A_0 e^{\mu t}$  ( $\mu$  = constant, exogenous rate of labour augmenting technological change)

Production per effective worker:  $\tilde{y}=f(\tilde{k})$ 

where:  $\tilde{y} \equiv Y/AL$   $\tilde{k} \equiv K/AL$ 



#### Steady-state equilibrium

- quantities in effective terms do not change:  $\frac{\dot{\tilde{y}}}{\tilde{y}} = \frac{\ddot{\tilde{c}}}{\tilde{c}} = \frac{\tilde{k}}{\tilde{k}} = 0$
- per capita quantities grow at the rate of technological progress  $\frac{\dot{y}}{v} = \frac{\dot{c}}{c} = \frac{\dot{k}}{k} = \mu$
- for any  $k_0 > 0$ , optimal capital-consumption path converges asymptotically to balanced path (Cass, 1965)
- if transversality conditions are met, an economy that reaches the balanced growth path will remain on it

## **Endogenous growth theories**

Provide a formal solution to the problem of how to treat formally of the relationship between:

- public aspect of technological knowledge
- endogenous nature of technological change

Economic goods can be characterised on the basis of two features:

- excludability  $\rightarrow$  possibility to prevent people who haven't paid for a good from benefiting from it
- $\rightarrow$  the use of a good by one agent prevents its simultaneous use by others rivalry

**Technological knowledge** is non-rival and (partially) non-excludable  $\Rightarrow$  a **public good** (Arrow, 1962)

#### Implications:

consider a production function:  $Y = F(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{N})$ 

where **R** stands for all rival inputs (e.g. L and K) while **N** is the non-rival input (technological knowledge)

- assume perfect competition
- F is homogenous of degree 1 in rival inputs  $\Rightarrow$

⇒ Y is used up in remunerating rival inputs  
(Euler's Theorem: F L,K = 
$$L\frac{\partial F}{\partial L} + K\frac{\partial F}{\partial K}$$
)

- if technological knowledge increases  $\Rightarrow$  F globally presents increasing returns to scale
  - but no output is left to remunerate technological knowledge  $\Rightarrow$

#### **Endogenous growth theories**

#### Possible solutions: technological knowledge is

- non-rival, perfectly non-excludable (pure public good) and exogenous
  - → traditional neoclassical model
    - technological knowledge receives no remuneration
    - perfect competition
    - the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal
- non-rival, perfectly non-excludable (pure public good) and endogenous (side-effect of other activities)
  - $\Rightarrow$  pure external effect)
  - $\rightarrow$  AK models: Romer 1986; Lucas 1988
    - technological knowledge receives no remuneration
    - perfect competition
    - the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal due to the external effects (perfect excludability)
- non-rival, partially excludable (partial public good) and endogenous (intentional creation)
  - → Romer 1990a & b; Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992
    - technological knowledge receives remuneration (partial excludability)
    - monopolistic competition
    - the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal due to the external effects (partial excludability)

## The Romer (1990) model



A: blueprints for intermediate inputs & technological knowledge H<sub>A</sub>: human capital employed in research

production involves a fixed cost (patent) and a variable cost (forgone outpt)

additively separable function of all intermediate inputs an increase in the number of intermediate inputs raises TFP

#### **Research activity:**

- increases technological knowledge (and raises productivity of H<sub>A</sub>) → completely **non-excludable** effect
- increases the number of intermediate inputs  $\rightarrow$  completely **excludable** effect (via patents)  $\Rightarrow$  monopolistic competition

#### Steady state equilibrium

- capital accumulation framework: consumers maximise intertemporal utility
- allocation: consumers decide how to allocate human capital among research and manufacturing activities
- constant growth rate for y, k and c:  $g = \frac{\delta H \tau \rho}{\tau \sigma + 1} \Rightarrow$  **dynamic scale effect** through H where:  $\tau$  (>0) = constant depending on  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ,  $\sigma$  (>0) = risk aversion coefficient,  $\rho$  (>0) = intertemporal discount rate

# The Fujita-Thisse (2003) model

2 regions: A and B

3 sectors: T (trac	produce	nous consumption good d under constant returns and perfect competition ipped across regions at no cost
M (mc	odern) produces produces p(i) = mil	s <i>M</i> varieties of a consumption good d under monopolistic competition I price of variety <i>i</i>
D /inn		across regions at a (positive) cost
K (INNO	ovation) develops	d under constant returns and perfect competition
	•	from technological spillovers
	benenits	nom technological spinovers
2 factors: L (uns	killed): employe	d in T and M
	each wo	rker is endowed with one unit
	constant	overall supply (L)
	evenly d	istributed and immobile across regions (L/2 in each region)
H (skil	led): employe	d in R
	each wo	rker is endowed with one unit
	constant	overall supply
	mobile (v	with a positive cost)

## The Fujita-Thisse (2003) model

#### The research sector

- productivity of researchers in one region increases with knowledge capital (K) available in the same region
- knowledge capital in one regions benefits from spillovers from the other region

$$\mathbf{K}_{At} = \left(\frac{\mathbf{H}_{At}}{\mathbf{H}} + \eta \frac{\mathbf{H}_{Bt}}{\mathbf{H}}\right)^{\gamma\beta} \mathbf{M}_{t}$$

where  $\eta$  (0 $\leq \eta \leq 1$ ) measures the intensity of knowledge spillovers between regions (measure of "globalness" of knowledge)

the flow of new varieties (patents) is sum of the regional flows

$$\dot{\mathbf{M}}_{t} = \mathbf{n}_{At} + \mathbf{n}_{Bt} = \frac{\mathbf{H}_{At}}{\mathbf{H}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{H}_{At}}{\mathbf{H}} + \eta \frac{\mathbf{H}_{Bt}}{\mathbf{H}} \right)^{1/\beta} \mathbf{M}_{t} + \frac{\mathbf{H}_{Bt}}{\mathbf{H}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{H}_{Bt}}{\mathbf{H}} + \eta \frac{\mathbf{H}_{At}}{\mathbf{H}} \right)^{1/\beta} \mathbf{M}_{t}$$

 $\Rightarrow$  growth rate of new varieties (patents):  $\frac{M}{M}$ 

$$\frac{\dot{M}_{t}}{M_{t}} = g\left(\frac{H_{At}}{H}\right)$$

symmetric around 1/2; g(0) = g(1) = 1

for  $\eta < 1$ :  $g(\bullet)$  is highest when the R-sector is agglomerated in one region;

g(•) is lowest when the R-sector is fully dispersed

for given  $H_A/H$ ,  $g(\bullet)$  increases with  $\eta$  ("localness" of knowledge slows down innovation)

for  $\eta = 1$ :  $g(\bullet) = 1$  (when knowledge is global, the spatial distribution of the R-sector no longer matters)

### The Fujita-Thisse (2003) model

**Steady-state when migration is allowed**  $\rightarrow$  3 equilibria: 1. H<sub>A</sub>/H = 1/2 unstable 2. H<sub>A</sub>/H = 1 stable 3. H<sub>A</sub>/H = 0 stable

Concentrating on stable equilibria (e.g.,  $H_A/H = 1$ )

i when transport cost is high

region A contains the entire R-sector  $(H_A/H = 1)$  and a larger share of the M-sector

ii when transport cost is low

region A contains both the R-sector and the M-sector entirely  $(H_A/H = 1; M_A = M)$ 

#### **Main implications**

- starting from a dispersed equilibrium (H<sub>A</sub>/H=1/2; M<sub>A</sub>=M<sub>B</sub>=1/2) any perturbation leads to a coreperiphery structure
- if perturbation is such that H<sub>A</sub>/H >1/2:
  - $\rightarrow$  all R-sector will agglomerate in region A
  - $\rightarrow$  most (or all, depending on transport costs) M-sector will agglomerate in A
  - $\rightarrow$  the growth rate of the economy increases as the R-sector agglomerates
  - $\rightarrow$  average real income in A increases relative to B

#### Main unappealing features

→ high transport costs and immobility of unskilled workers are needed to avoid extreme solutions (i.e., complete concentration of activities)

#### Main features (Magrini, 1997)

- two urban regions at some distance one from the other
- three sectors (research, capital goods, final good)
  - final: produces a homogeneous consumption good employing unskilled labor, human capital, and physical capital
  - intermediate: physical capital is made up of a set of specialized intermediate inputs produced by profit maximizing entrepreneurs using forgone output and a patent
  - research: produces patents (and knowledge) using human capital and knowledge
- two forms of knowledge spillovers:
  - abstract knowledge: spills over freely to all researchers, in all regions
  - tacit knowledge: spills over as a result of interaction between individuals
- spillovers of tacit knowledge are hampered by distance
  - → introduction and development of broadband technology and hi-speed connection reduces this friction

#### The research sector

The flow of new knowledge (and patents) created in i is:

 $\dot{A}_{i} = \delta_{i}Hr_{i}Hr_{i}^{\phi}\left(Hr_{j}d_{ij}^{-1/\beta_{ij}}\right)A$ 

where:

- H<sub>ri</sub> is the level of human capital employed in the research sector of i
- $\delta_i$  is the level of technological competence of the research sector located in i
- A is the number of intermediate inputs existing in the system (overall level of abstract knowledge)
- φ reflects the size of intra-regional spillovers of tacit knowledge
- $\beta_{ij}$  reflects the potential benefit to researchers in i from interaction with researcher in j

$$\beta_{ij} : \begin{cases} = 1 & \text{if } \delta_i > \delta_j \\ > 1 & \text{if } \delta_j > \delta_i \end{cases}$$

d<sub>ij</sub> is the distance between i and j

#### The intermediate good sector

- fixed cost (patent)
  - $\Rightarrow$  monopolistic competition
  - ⇒ in the long run, resources to finance the research effort equalize the present discounted value of future profits
- variable cost → one unit of intermediate input requires one unit of forgone output

#### The final good sector

- presence of external effects:
  - positive: an increase in the number of intermediate inputs increases TFP
  - negative: agglomeration manufacturing activities causes the emergence of congestion cost
    - → the size of these diseconomies depends also on the size of the regional research sector as concentration of research negatively affects local manufacturing firms through land rents
      - → managerial and research personnel are attracted by relatively expensive, sophisticated leisure and consumption amenities (Malecki, 1987).
      - $\rightarrow$  due to its effect on land markets, the concentration of research within one urban area poses a burden on the firms located there
      - → within the local research sector these diseconomies are more than offset by dynamic externalities deriving from localized spillovers of tacit knowledge

$$Q_{i} = L_{i}^{\alpha} Hq_{i}^{\eta} \Big[ \int_{A_{i}} x_{i}(a_{i})^{\gamma} da + \int_{A_{j}} x_{i}(a_{j})^{\gamma} da \Big] Hr_{i}^{-\lambda L_{i}} \qquad \text{with } \alpha + \eta + \gamma = 1 \qquad \rightarrow \text{perfect competition}$$

Individuals

- fixed overall supply of human capital  $H = H_{qi} + H_{qj} + H_{ri} + H_{rj}$
- fixed overall supply of unskilled labor  $L = L_i + L_j$
- as workers, they move freely across regions and, in the case of human capital, across sectors and evaluate locations and sectors solely in terms of wage rates
- as consumers, they maximize intertemporal (CES) utility with savings devoted to the acquisition of physical capital

$$U[C] = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} L_i^\alpha \frac{C^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} dt$$

 $\boldsymbol{\rho}$  is the intertemporal rate of discount and

 $\sigma^{-1}$  (with 0< $\sigma$ <1) is the willingness to substitute intertemporally



#### Steady state equilibrium

- constant (common) growth rate in per capita income
- the growth rate positively depends on overall stock of human capital  $\Rightarrow$  dynamic scale effect
- **stable differences in per capita income levels** across urban regions
- differences are due to specialisation:
  - → the region in which productivity of researchers is higher ends up concentrating most research activities; the other region ends up specialising in manufacturing
  - $\rightarrow$  since research makes a more intensive use of human capital, specialisation leads to concentration of human capital
  - → since human capital receives a higher wage than raw labour, income per capita is higher in the region that specialises in research

#### Introduction and development of broadband technology and hi-speed connection

- takes the form of a reduction of the "cost of distance" for knowledge spillovers
- by strengthening spillovers across urban regions, reinforces the degree of specialisation
- two effects:
  - → internal and external allocation effects lead to a higher (common) growth rate
  - $\rightarrow$  external allocation effect leads to stronger regional disparities

A rough attempt to get some tentative evidence...

Take the log of representation of the research sector:

 $log(new patents_{it}) = log(knowledge_t) + log(Hr_{it})\alpha + Wlog(Hr_{jt})\beta + \varepsilon$ 

Panel Fixed Effect estimation of an SLX model for MSAs (with largest flows of patents in 2005)

Time: 2005-2015

Dep. Variable: log of utility patents

	Top 100	Top 150
Log of unskilled workers (High School or less)	0.4850***	0.0380***
	(0.1031)	(0.0798)
Log of skilled workers (Bachelor or more)	0.5904***	0.5295***
	(0.1154)	(0.0860)
Spatial lag of log of skilled workers	0.1359***	0.0963***
	(0.0208)	(0.0121)
γ	0.0421	0.0312
	(0.0258)*	(0.0198)

Notes:  $W = distance^{-\gamma}$ 

 $\gamma$  estimated non linearly as in Halleck Vega and Elhorst (2015)

Regressions include year dummies interacted with log of Personal Income per capita

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